

# FINAL REPORT

## PROJECT OF REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA

CCF. Angola  
September, 1998

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## INTRODUCTION

All over the world today there are thousands of children involved in armed conflict. Every day these children, " instead of going to school, take up arms and go to war."

The participation of children in armed conflict, apart from putting their lives at risk, deprives the children of the warmth of family life, takes them away from their communities, compromises their personal and professional future and creates serious distortions on a psychological and moral level. The consequences are profound and the repercussions can be irreversible.

In Angola, many children have been involved directly or indirectly in armed conflict. We have no exact data concerning the exact number of children who have been involved in war. In 1996, the process of demobilization of child-soldiers began, under the auspices of the Lusaka Protocol.

The present report refers to activities which CCF has developed within the Project of Reintegration of Demobilized Child -Soldiers in the period between September 1996 and 31st of August 1998. We analyze the process of reunification and family and community reintegration of Child-Soldiers, the successes and the main problems we faced and the lessons which can be learnt from the process as a whole.

*CCF is an international Non-Governmental Organization* which since August 1994 has been involved in the implementation of a Program of Psycho-social Reintegration of Children affected by the War. From September, 1996 to August, 1998, CCF implemented, with financial support from USAID and from UNICEF, the Project of Reintegration of Child-Soldiers. This work consists mainly in the preparation and sensitizing of the communities to facilitate the return of the demobilized soldiers who are children, helping them to find their families and be reunited with them, and in doing a follow-up study of their social reintegration .

In this report we describe the special contribution of activists from different churches, of the Traditional Village Chiefs and traditional healers, focusing on their role at each phase of the project.

The data which we are using concerns the implementation of the Project in the provinces of Benguela, Bie, Huambo, Huila, Malange, Moxico and Uige. Included in the province of Uige is data relating to the municipality of Kamabatela, which administratively belongs to the province Kuanza-Norte.

## I. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROCESS OF DEMOBILIZATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA

### - Process of Demobilization

The Protocol of Lusaka, the Peace Agreement signed by the Government of the Republic of Angola and by UNITA (armed opposition), defined CHILD SOLDIERS - soldiers who are minors and the disabled as vulnerable and priority groups within the process of demobilization and reintegration of the Armed Forces. CHILD SOLDIERS are those who are either from FAA or from UNITA and who were born on or after 1st January, 1978.

Child Soldiers were given the right of exemption from obligatory military service, so that it would not be possible for them to be recruited into the army at a later date. They received a series of benefits (money and support materials for their resettlement) and those who were not present on the day of demobilization were given the right to be demobilized during a period of 6 months after the Extension of State Administration throughout Angola.

For the Minors the process of demobilization was carried out according to the stipulations of the General Law on Military Service, beginning on 24th September 1996 when senior military officers identified their respective military forces, i.e. the young people who were in this category. The administrative process led to the incorporation of the FAAs (the two armies) and this was followed by the start of demobilization.

9,133 child soldiers were registered in total, being 520 from the FAA and 8,613 from UNITA. Of this total, 491 were selected and incorporated in the FAA, 5,171 were demobilized and 3,471, who at the time of demobilization were not in the quartering areas, came under the so-called "Open File"

### Data relating to the process of demobilization

Category	Number
Total number of minors registered	9,133
Total number of minors demobilized	5,171
Demobilized to the provinces of CCF/UNICEF	4,104
Demobilized and transported from the Quartering areas of UNITA	4,811
Demobilized by Government Forces	360
Minors still to be demobilized (Open File)	3,471
Minors incorporated in FAA	491


Source: UCAH/ - Final Report on the Demobilization of CHILD SOLDIERS", 1998

Data from OIM in relation to the 4,641 child soldiers who were transported to their regions of origin, show that most (93.6%) come within the age group of 16-19. Of these 11.87% are 16

years old, 22.11% are 17, 35.98% are 18 and 23.64% are 19. (See UCAH - Final Report on the demobilization of Child Soldiers 1998)

The largest number of demobilized minors were transported to the provinces of Huambo, Malange, Benguela, Bie, Huila and Kuanza Norte. (See UCAH - Final Report on the demobilization of Child Soldiers 1998)

According to the provision made in December of 1996, 5,652 child soldiers would be transported to the seven provinces where CCF works. In fact 4,104 child soldiers were transported and demobilized to these provinces, including the municipality of Kamabatela in the province of K. Norte., which represents 72.6%. It should be noted that in the province of Huambo, more child soldiers returned than was initially planned, the same thing happened in Uige and Kamabatela.



Province	No.of Minors to be demobilized	No. of Minors demobilized.	%	No of Minors accompanied
BENGUELA	1,084	658	60.70	315
BIE	840	658	78.33	278
HUAMBO	840	983	117.02	309
HUILA	896	460	51.33	290
MALANGE	1,596	928	58.14	210
MOXICO	130	121	93.07	84
UIGE-K.N.	266	296	111.28	135
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,652</b>	<b>4104</b>	<b>72.61</b>	<b>1621</b>

Data taken from the registers made by UCAH

## **National Program of Demobilization of Child Soldiers and their re-integration**

In November of 1995 the National Program for Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers was created, involving the international community, various agencies of the United Nations, government entities and non-governmental organizations.. UCAH Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid to Angola, MINARS- the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration, UNICEF, OIM International Organization of Migration, WFP, The Christian Children's Fund, Save the Children Fund(UK) and other Non-governmental Organizations . Coordination was in the hands of a committee led by UCAH.

### **Phases of the Program:**

- 1- **Preparation:** Definition of concepts recognizing the rights of child soldiers and the translation of these projects into something practical and easy to implement.
2. **Quartering:** identification of the soldiers, the process of finding families was started, a medical examination, the distribution of kits and food aid and the program of civic training was developed.
3. **Demobilization:** Ensuring conditions for reunification the minors' families including transport and resettlement, with food aid and kits.
4. **Social Reintegration:** Ensuring the social-occupational, economic and psychosocial well being of the demobilized soldiers, involving SeCor and IRSEM and CCF and UNICEF.

## **II STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT OF REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS, IMPLEMENTED BY CCF.**

### **2.1- General Objective**

- Contribute to the psychological and social reintegration of minors who were involved in armed conflict in Angola.

### **2.2 Specific Objectives**

- Contribute to the psychosocial well being of the demobilized Child Soldiers from the two armies.
- Sensitize and mobilize the communities where the Minors will be reintegrated
- Promote the rights of the minors and support their social, occupational and educational reintegration
- Contribute to the capacity of intervention of local leaders (Traditional village chiefs and religious leaders) to help in the process of reintegration..

### **2.3 Context in which the project was implemented.**

The Project was implemented in the same context in which the Protocol of Lusaka was being implemented i.e. in a complex climate of continuing Peace negotiations, in which an atmosphere of instability and insecurity reigned. - Neither war-Nor peace.

The context was characterized by:

- Destruction and degradation of the social and economic infrastructures of the country
- Progressive degradation of the living standards of the communities (communities which were very poor and very dependent on external aid.)
- Increase in the level of dependence and passivity of the population
- Acceptance of war as a normal situation, people resigned and impotent as a result of the atmosphere of violence and of war.
- Changes in the relationships between adults and children. Adults became: less tolerant, more violent, less sensitive to the problems of the children
- Loss of self esteem and self confidence in people
- Increase in sentiments of mistrust between people
- Loss of perspective in relation to the future - loss of hope
- Generalized fear
- Alteration or loss of cultural values, negation of tradition and passive acceptance of other practices and customs.  
Adults transmitted sentiments of hate, vengeance, contempt for others and sad memories
- Loss of identity and respect, lack of sensitivity to human life.

### **2.4- Strategy**

- Recruitment of local teams of religious activists within the communities to work with children and demobilized youngsters and to support them in the task of reintegration into their families and communities.
- Reinforce the capacity of intervention of traditional authorities, leaders and religious activists.  
Dissemination of information on the impact of war, education for peace and national reconciliation

### **2.5- Activities**

- Recruitment and training of a network of local activists so that they could help in the process of reunification of families and in the reintegration of Child Soldiers into the community.
- Sensitizing of families and of communities to facilitate the return of Child Soldiers
- Participation in tracing and in reuniting the families of the Child Soldiers.
- Looking for alternative solutions for the Child Soldiers whose families do not appear on the day of demobilization, and for those who have lost contact with their relatives
- Support for the Child Soldiers in the process of reintegration into the community through the support of the activists.
- Participation in the identification of the needs and promotion of the rights of Child Soldiers

- Promotion in conjunction with counterparts to implement Projects of Rapid Impact and create other educational and occupational opportunities for the Child Soldiers
- Organization of Support services, giving advice and providing psycho-social counseling for the Child Soldiers, to allow them to overcome the effects of the traumatic events which they had lived through during the war.

## **2.6 Critical Assumptions**

The Project was established with the following perspectives:

- That the country would be involved in a process of real peace and economic and social stabilization,.
- There would be obstacles and problems at the level of the community in the acceptance of Child Soldiers because they had belonged to the other side - they would not be accepted by the community;
- The Child soldiers would not know where to find their families, they would be lost and would not remember their homes as a result of the long period of time they had spent as soldiers;
- The general support program for the demobilized and the policies established would be successfully applied. Each partner would fully implement their part of the program.

Throughout the implementation of the Project these suppositions were to a certain extent abandoned, as they did not correspond to reality. CCF had to redefine its role and in some cases had to adopt new functions.

In practice, during reintegration, there were no cases of rejection or hostility to the Child Soldiers on the part of their families. During the tracing, there were some cases in which families, at the beginning, did not turn up or did not want to identify certain Child Soldiers because they had fought on the opposite side. But during the reunification process this did not happen.

## **2.7 Established Targets**

Attain: 3,000 Child Soldiers demobilized and transported to the provinces of Benguela, Bie, Huambo, Huila, Malange, Moxico and Uige.

Recruit: 300 local religious activists belonging to the Catholic Church and other Churches.

## **III- METHODOLOGY OF WORK**

### **3.1- Methods of work**

- Visits initially fortnightly, then monthly and bi-monthly to the activist and to the homes of the Minors
- Meetings with activists and with the minors
- Monthly meetings of Project Provincial Coordinators with the activists
- Coordination Meetings on a quarterly basis (of Coordinators with the National team of supervisors and the Head of CCF)
- Meetings of the Provincial Coordinators with the minors.

### 3.2- Instruments and Technical means used in the collection of Data

For the collection of data the interview method was used and a questionnaire was administered to the minors and their families. As instruments they were used to measure:

- Scale of Exposure to the War
- Scale of Impact of the War on the Children
- Individual file on the progress of the demobilized Minor
- File on the tracing of the family
- Index register at the Meeting Point
- Model of the monthly report
- File on the monthly register of work of the activist.

### IV- AREAS OF INTERVENTION

Initially 217 religious activists worked in tracing and reunification of Child Soldiers in 116 "comunas"\* of 60 municipalities in 7 provinces, to which almost 85% of demobilized Child Soldiers had gone.

In other provinces a network was created with its own characteristics which differ from the network created and run by CCF and UNICEF. ACF(UK), Caritas, WFP (World Food Program) worked in these. MINARS AND SECOR were involved in all the provinces ( please see map of partners)

\* (The smallest administrative division in Angola)

<b>ZONES OF INTERVENTION MUNICIPALITIES IN WHICH CCF INTERVENED</b>		
<b>PROVINCE</b>	<b>Oct.96-Dec.97</b>	<b>Jan-Aug.98</b>
BENGUELA	9	9
BIE	7	6
HUAMBO	11	9
HUILA	11	9
MALANGE	5	2
MOXICO	6	3
UIGE-K.N.	11	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>42</b>

## **Areas of Access**

From September, 1996 to March, 1997, it was possible to reach almost all the localities, except where the road conditions were bad and where bridges had been destroyed. At this time, there were some localities that were difficult to penetrate, or localities where work depended on the authorization of UNITA authorities (Geographical Map 1)

Between April and December of 1997 the number of areas of access gradually became fewer and fewer. Several localities where access had previously been possible became inaccessible, and the work of supervision and travel to these areas was made very difficult. (See Geographical Map 2)

Soon after the end of demobilization, mainly in the period between April and August of 1998, with the worsening of the political and military situation, we were unable to continue working in 30% of the localities where previously we had been active. (See Geographical Map 3)

## **Phases of Implementation of the Project**

The project was implemented in 3 different phases, as the Flow Chart shows.

## SECOND PART: ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED AND RESULTS ACHIEVED

### I- PREPARATION AND SENSITIZATION PHASE WITHIN THE COMMUNITIES

#### Activities developed during this phase:

- Sensitization of the traditional local bodies, local authorities and the population in general
- Contact with the families and their communities to inform them of the return of the Child Soldiers
- Inform the families of the arrival dates of the Child Soldiers, through radio announcements and announcements made at religious ceremonies
- Meetings with religious bodies
- Tracing of the Child Soldiers' families
- Recruitment and training of the community activists
- Decision regarding the *Meeting Points*\*

\* *Meeting Points*- places chosen for the reunion of the Child Soldiers with their families. The families were informed of their localization and went to them to meet the minors. Generally they were situated in front of parishes or Catholic Church premises, schools or local authority buildings. They were places, where there was maximum security for the Child Soldiers, situated in localities relatively near to their final destinations.

#### **- Activities carried out within the scope of sensitization with traditional bodies, leaders and the population in general**

86 sensitization meetings were held with the local authorities and with the population in general. In most localities where CCF was present it was possible to make positive contact with the population in order to prepare for the arrival of the child soldiers.

The meetings were as follows: 6 were held in Benguela, 20 in Bié, 5 in Huambo, 7 in Huila, 23 in Malange, 8 in Moxico and 17 in Uige.

Church members, political leaders from UNITA and/or from the Government, Traditional Chiefs with their deputies and the local population in general were present at the meetings. In some places they were only held with traditional leaders and with local authorities for security reasons, and because of pressure of time.

These meetings were enthusiastically attended, in spite of a certain climate of fear and distrust. A lot of families had received no news of their sons for more than 2 or 3 years, and many presumed they had died. The continual postponements and general issues associated with the implementation of the peace process had added to people's skepticism .

In many cases, there was evidence of enthusiasm and manifestations of belief in the peace process; the satisfaction which was shown, made the reunions moments for the sharing of emotions, allowed a reduction in the level of anxiety, and renewed hope in the peace process, and the possibility of reconciliation between Angolans.

In those areas of difficult access, the mobilization and sensitization of the communities in relation to the reunion with the child soldiers happened at the moment at which they arrived.

### **- Meetings with religious bodies**

Throughout the project a series of meetings was held with religious bodies. These took place mainly during the first phase, in order to explain the objectives of the project, and ask for the support and assistance of the church, the terms of participation and the role of activists were discussed in order to select the provincial Coordinators.

During the project 111 meetings were held with religious bodies (Bishops, Vicars and parish priests), 23 in Benguela, 14 in Bié, 10 in Huambo, 3 in Huila, 21 in Malange, 11 in Moxico and 29 in Uige.

The Churches were chosen as partners or counterparts because, in spite of the war, they have managed to maintain their structures throughout Angola, and are the most efficient or most capable organizations at the level of the community, able to carry out the broad-scale task of pacification and reconciliation.

### **- Family tracing of the child soldiers**

It was possible to locate **1,500** child soldiers' families which represents **36.54%** of the number of families transported to the provinces where CCF was active.

In percentage terms the province of Moxico managed to locate the most families, i.e. 85% of the Child Soldiers who had been transported to that province. This was because:

- it was the last of the seven provinces where demobilization took place, in such a way that the activists had a longer period of time to locate the families.
- the transportation of the child soldiers was carried out in the interior of the province itself, and the child soldiers were from the quartering area situated in the same province.

However, in real terms, the highest number of families located was in the province of Malange, where 704 families were found, making up 76% of the child soldiers' relatives transported to that province. This happened for the following reasons:

- Access to 80% of provincial territory (trips to 12 of the 14 municipalities), at the time of demobilization
- Efficient coordination work between partners
- Dynamism of the provincial team.

The provinces where the lowest percentage of families was located were those of Huambo (13%) and Huila (14%). This was due to:

- Coordination problems between the partners
- Families' reticence or fear in identifying themselves
- Problems of transport for the CCF team and for the activists

<b>Correlation between the child soldiers transported and success in Locating their families</b>			
<b>PROVÍNCIA</b>	<b>Child Soldiers Transported</b>	<b>Child Soldiers with Families located*</b>	<b>%</b>
BENGUELA	658	221	34
BIÉ	658	173	27
HUAMBO	983	121	13
HUILA	460	64	14
MALANGE	928	704	76
MOXICO	121	102	85
UIGE-K.N.	296	115	39
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4,104</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>37</b>

- This table relates to families located before demobilization of the child soldiers started.

As we can see from the table, in the provinces where CCF was active we managed to locate 37% of child soldiers' families. In Huambo, the work of locating families proved very difficult, because the HQ of UNITA was situated (in Bailundo), and it was the place where the process of demobilization began. There was a lot of fear and distrust.

In general, it was not possible to locate more families because:

- there were problems of access to various localities
- at the beginning the activists did not have means of transport (bicycles)
- the families had moved
- poor quality of the registers compiled in the Quartering Areas - the names of other relatives should have been declared: aunts, uncles, cousins, traditional chiefs, priests, etc. but were not
- fear, on the part of some families, of declaring that they were related to the Child Soldiers, who had fought on the opposing side
- families' distrust of the role of the activists.

### **Aspects relevant during the sensitization and family tracing**

In this phase there were many interesting cases. In Malange for example, due to the division of territory in areas under the control of UNITA, and others under the control of the government, there were cases in which some families were located on "both sides": sometimes, the father was in a Government controlled area, while the mother and other relatives had stayed in areas in the hands of UNITA. Other times, to facilitate contact and to confirm family details, markets in frontier areas were used. Only the women could move and circulate with relative ease to these areas. Many of these women were used to pass on information at the markets, during the contacts, which they maintained while bartering their wares.

In general, in order to locate families, on Saturdays and Sundays the activists disseminated information during religious services. They contacted the families, visited homes and villages using the lists of those Child Soldiers to be demobilized.

The traditional chiefs and the community leaders constituted a very important resource during the process of locating the families. They knew where the families were to be found, if they had moved to other regions, if they were dead, and if the names on the lists referred to people who were from their areas, etc.

The political climate of the moment, the concept of "two sides" and /or "this side and that side", persistent fears, the fact that the process had a strong component of information collection, which penetrated deep into the intimacy of community structures, and the political organizations or bodies in each area, contributed to the creation of a climate of fear and sensitivity.

## II. PHASE OF REUNIFICATION WITH FAMILIES

Activities which took place during this phase:

- Organization of the reception of Child Soldiers at designated Meeting Points
- Adopting alternative solutions for the reunification of the Child Soldiers whose families did not turn up at the Meeting Points (tracing of relatives with the help of the Child Soldiers, handing them over into the care of priests, of local authorities: traditional chiefs or administrators and/or substitute families)
- Registering of Child Soldiers at the designated Meeting Points and the start of the follow up process.
- Integration of the minors in transport convoys from the quartering areas to their areas of origin.

### Data

The CCF teams were present when 2,153 Child Soldiers were reunited with their families, which represents 52.46% of those transported to the seven provinces where CCF was active.

In spite of having only located 1,500 Child Soldiers' families, it was possible to reunite a far higher number (2,153) because after the arrival of the minors in their respective communities, it was easier for the activists, with the help of the minors themselves to find their families and reunite them.

<b>CORRELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF CHILD SOLDIERS TRANSPORTED AND THOSE REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES WITH THE HELP OF CCF</b>			
<i>PROVINCE</i>	<i>Child Soldiers Transported</i>	<i>Child Soldiers Reunited</i>	<i>%</i>
BENGUELA	658	394	58.9
BIÉ	658	235	35.7
HUAMBO	983	368	37.4
HUILA	460	151	32.8
MALANGE	928	760	81.9
MOXICO	121	9	7.4
UIGE-K.N.	296	236	79.7
TOTAL	4,104	2,153	52.5

In the provinces of Malange and in Uige-Kamabatela, it was possible to reunite 81.9% and 79.7% respectively of the Child Soldiers transported to those provinces. This was due to the good coordination work carried out in conjunction with IOM, UCAH and UNITA.

In establishing a relationship between the process of tracing and reunification, we noted the following:


- the number of Child Soldiers reunited in the presence of CCF is higher than the number of families located, except in the province of Moxico, where we were only present when 7% of the Child Soldiers were transported to that province, due to poor coordination with the partners. CCF was later informed that the Child Soldiers had reached their communities.

### Arrival of the Child Soldiers in their communities

Of the total of Child Soldiers reunited with the help of CCF, 560 (26%) were received directly by their families on the day of their arrival at the Meeting Points. The majority (64.51%), were handed over to religious activists (CCF activists) who took on the responsibility of accompanying and helping reunite them with their respective families. The others (9.5%), stayed temporarily under the care of local authorities (traditional leaders, priests or nuns or sometimes-local administrators.)

CHILD SOLDIERS REINTEGRATED WITH THE HELP OF CCF								
(Data on the reintegration immediately after demobilization)*								
<b>PROVINCE</b>	<b>Beng</b>	<b>Bié</b>	<b>Hbo</b>	<b>Huila</b>	<b>Mal</b>	<b>Mox</b>	<b>Uige</b>	<b>Total</b>
Received by their families		2	36	1	492	5	24	560
Received by local authorities (traditional chiefs, religious bodies)	18	1	80	30	56	3	16	204
Received by religious activists (catechists)	376	232	252	120	212	1	196	1389
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>368</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>2153</b>

\* Received at the Meeting Points



As can be seen from the table and the graph, most families (74%) did not appear at the Meeting Points on the day of arrival of the Child Soldiers, this was due to:

- Logistic failures and constant alterations of the transportation dates established for the Child Soldiers
- The families were not sure of the date of arrival of the Child Soldiers in their communities
- The difficulties encountered by the families in getting to the Meeting Points
- Problems on the paths and roads, and the fact that some bridges had been destroyed
- Security problems and fear on the part of the families of travelling to certain localities
- The late arrival of trucks (sometimes at night) at the Meeting Points.

Although announcements were made on the radio stating the arrival dates of the Child Soldiers, few families heard them (not having radios), and neither were the dates given adhered to. At times, there was a delay of more than 4 weeks. The families gave up waiting and returned to their places of origin, sometimes walking more than fifty kilometers.

The province of Malange was where the majority of Child Soldiers (492) were received directly by their families on the day of their demobilization, which represents 64.7 % of the total of Child Soldiers reunited by CCF in that province.

In all the other provinces, the number of Child Soldiers received by their families is quite small. In all these provinces, the number of Child Soldiers received by CCF activists is quite high. (catechists).

## **Alternative Solutions encountered for those Child Soldiers who did not meet up with their families**

Of the total of Child Soldiers given support by CCF, only **53** were not reunited with their families and are now living with substitute families. They did not meet up with their own families, but were taken in by other families, mostly by people within the communities who have a leadership role. Throughout the project, efforts were made to find the real families of these Child Soldiers, but it was not possible, because there was not enough information available to do so.

### **Number and percentage of Child Soldiers placed in substitute families**

<i>Province</i>	<i>Nºof Child Soldiers Followed up</i>	<i>No of Child Soldiers placed with families</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Benguela	315	1	0.31
Bié	278	8	2.87
Huambo	309	11	3.56
Huíla	290	0	0
Malange	210	5	2.38
Moxico	84	6	7.14
Uíge-K.N.	135	22	16.29
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,621</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>8.53</b>

#### **- Relevant aspects of the reunification of families**

The activists helped in mobilizing the communities to receive the Child Soldiers. People sang and danced spontaneously, showing great joy.

The phase of reunification was quite moving. The families received the Child Soldiers with great enthusiasm and joy, much greater than initially expected. It was thought that the community would feel a certain fear receiving their sons who had fought "on the other side".

Reunited, the joy was such that most people cried, shouted, received the minors throwing flour in their faces and/or sprinkling their faces, heads and chests with water.

The mothers placed their sons (already grown up) on their laps, on their backs and walked around, danced, and sang... others fell over, rolling on the ground...giving thanks, embracing and shaking hands for a long time. There were signs of hope on the faces of the people and belief in a peaceful future, commenting "at last peace has really arrived".

This phase demanded a lot of sacrifices on the part of the teams. The transportation was carried out during the rainy season, going over broken or damaged bridges, through extremely insecure areas, bad roads, poor logistic conditions, difficulties in coordination and in the sharing out of responsibilities amongst the different partners, sometimes with negative results in the coordination and communication of dates of departure and arrival of the trucks.

The fact that the demobilized knew their villages and houses was of great help. Sometimes their homes were on the way to the Meeting Points, so they were dropped immediately near their

houses. When the families were not at the Meeting Point, the activists took the minors to their doors.

The activists talked with the families, and from that moment, the process of follow-up of the minors began.

For the reception, CCF and the Catholic Church established 102 Meeting Points, 9 in Benguela, 14 in Bié, 12 in Huambo, 11 in Huila, 23 in Malange, 7 in Moxico and 26 in Uige and Kamabatela.

To be truthful, in most cases, the Meeting Points did not function as we initially thought they would, especially, as the dates were frequently altered, there were delays in the arrival of the trucks and it was difficult to communicate quickly with the activists and with the families.

To remedy this situation, although it was not initially planned, CCF had to become part of the convoys transporting the Child Soldiers because:

- they did not respect the meeting points and the families had trouble finding them because of lack of information;
- later there were many difficulties in finding the Child Soldiers who were left at the meeting points without contact with an activist;
- it was not possible to have a clear perception of the process of reunification.

The provincial teams of CCF were present on **82 trips** to the municipalities in the interior accompanying the convoys, which transported the Child Soldiers.

During the phase of reunification, the greatest problem was the change and manipulation of the Child Soldiers' destinations by UNITA. The families, after being warned, became very anxious waiting for the return of their sons, which in many cases did not take place as their destination was altered.

In all the provinces an alliance with the Churches existed, particularly in the province of Huambo, where there was a great climate of tension and distrust between the two sides. Strategically a priest was selected to coordinate the Project.

In several quartering areas, the Child Soldiers were influenced in such a way as to avoid going through areas under the control of the government or return, if the case, to the localities controlled by them. They were told that they would be poisoned, mistreated or arrested if they did so.

In general the Child Soldiers were very afraid and very scared. The welcome they received on their return helped them a lot in their subsequent integration into the community. They felt accepted and loved by their relatives and friends.

There were some problems linked to the kits and money they had received. A lot of Child Soldiers after arriving at the Meeting Points had to walk long distances in order to reach their villages. Although they were generally helped or accompanied by activists or by relatives, there were cases in which their belongings, including all the things they had been given, were stolen. In other cases, their belongings were appropriated by administrators and military or political chiefs.

### III. REINTEGRATION PHASE

#### Activities undertaken at this phase:

- Home visits to the Child Soldiers by the activists
- Identification of the Child Soldiers' needs and the promotion of their rights
- The inclusion of the young people and minors in Church groups, which organised cultural and educational activities in order to keep them busy in their free time
- Sensitization and Counselling meetings with the minors
- Schooling and professional or occupational training for some demobilized minors
- Information was given to the families concerning the rights of the Child Soldiers
- Aid was given to encourage small project initiatives and fast impact projects
- Aid was given to IRSEM-SeCor and to WFP to help in the delivery of kits and free packs which the Minors had a right to
- Case studies of Child Soldiers who received traditional treatment and were reintegrated into the communities
- Evaluation of the degree of exposure and impact of the war on a sample group of Child Soldiers
- Compiling of individual files relating to the study and progress made by Child Soldiers.

During the phase of reintegration the activists did an individual follow-up on the Child Soldiers, in such a way that the demobilized minors began to consider them as Godparents or Guardians.

One very positive aspect was that most of the minors on arriving in their communities were received with traditional ceremonies of reintegration and purification rites, which in themselves helped in the reintegration process and gave the minors spiritual tranquility. These ceremonies varied from region to region and involved the minor's family and the community itself. In addition, in some cases, the minors were officially presented during religious cults and received a blessing.

During the last phase of the Project, CCF involvement was possible, not only in the identification and registering of needs, but also in the implementation of Projects of Rapid Impact.

The credibility acquired through this work, led to many Child Soldiers, who had initially been afraid of the process of follow up, subsequently asking for or requesting the help of the activists.

#### **Data relating the follow-up process of Child Soldiers**

<b>Correlation between the minors transported and Followed up by CCF -May,98</b>			
PROVINCE	TRANSPORTED	FOLLOWED-UP	PERCENTAGE
Benguela	658	315	47.9
Bié	658	278	42.2
Huambo	983	309	31.4
Huila	460	290	63.0
Malanje	928	210	22.6
Moxico	121	84	69.4
Uige	296	135	45.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,104</b>	<b>1,621</b>	<b>39.5</b>

We can see from this table that :

1- The majority of minors transported to the provinces where CCF was active (61%), had no contact whatsoever with activists/religious activists and did not even benefit from follow-up. Although CCF had endeavored to find them, it proved impossible. In some cases, it was because the Child Soldiers avoided contact with the activists, in other cases, because they were not actually present in the communities.

2- In the Province of Malange only 22.6 % of the Child Soldiers transported benefited from follow-up, amongst other reasons, because:

There were problems of access to municipalities to which the Child Soldiers went, contrary to what had happened in the first phase. In this phase it was only possible to be active in 5 of the 14 municipalities, for security reasons. In the last six months the areas in which it was possible to work have been reduced to only 3 municipalities.

1- In the provinces of Huila and Moxico it was possible to contact more than half the Child Soldiers transported there. This, amongst other reasons has to do with the fact that:

i) they were not zones of great political and military instability.

2- In the provinces of Benguela, Bié and Uige it was possible to follow-up on more than 40% of the minors, for the following reasons, amongst others:

i) Good coordination work between IOM and CCF in the transfer or transportation of the Child soldiers

ii) Access to the municipalities of the province

iii) Good and conscientious work on the part of the activists.

3- In Huambo it was possible to contact 31.4% of the Child soldiers transported there. This was because of :

i) Security problems and the climate of distrust.

ii) Problems of transport

iii) Intimidation of Child Soldiers in the quartering areas


### **Demonstration of the progress made in the follow-up process of minors by the activists**

Although the number of those followed up has increased gradually over the two years, the percentage in relation to the number of minors transported has been maintained at the level of 37%-38%. Although 4,104 were transported, according to data provided by IOM where CCF was present, follow-up was only possible in the case of 1,621 minors (39%).

*Correlation between the number of demobilized minors and those who had follow-up in the different quarters*

QUARTER	Demobilized by provinces of the Project	% of Child Soldiers Demobilized	Number of Child Soldiers we followed up	% of Child Soldiers followed-up
Sept/Nov 96	1,149	-	-	-
Dec./96-Feb 97	2,241	87	713	<b>32.0</b>
Mar/ May 97	2,462	83	851	<b>34.5</b>
Jun/August. 97	3,578	78	1,358	<b>38.0</b>
Sept/Nov. 97	4,104	79	1,470	<b>36.0</b>
Dec.97-Feb.98	4,104	79	1,599	<b>37.0</b>
Mar/May 98	4,104	79	1,621	<b>39.5</b>

In the period after May, 1998, due to the worsening of the political and military situation it became difficult to obtain data, because contact was lost with the most of the minors and with some activists



## **Individual record cards collected during the follow-up**

The individual record cards were used periodically to collect information regarding the process of family and social reintegration of the minors. They supplied information concerning their activity and occupation in the community, their interests, state of health and their psychosocial progress. We collected this data on a quarterly basis. It was not possible to do this in every locality and as originally planned for the following reasons:

- The refusal of local authorities owing to distrust and fear
- Absence of Child-Soldiers in their homes when visited by the activist
- Unwillingness or lack of interest on the part of the Child-Soldiers in supplying the said information.

In spite of the conditions in which the project was implemented, it was possible to collect 1,847 individual record cards, 67.13% of them were filled in for the first time, 18% for the second time, 9% for the third time and only 6% were filled in more than 3 times. Every time the activists went to see the Child-Soldiers in order to fill in the record cards they talked to the minors and their families.

The record card focused on questions of a social nature and for this reason caused great anxiety and false expectations on the part of the families who then expected, at any moment, that their worries or problems would be solved.

## **IV- QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS**

After the identification of needs of the Child-Soldiers the activists helped in the formulation of Quick Impact Projects. These were instigated at the behest of or as a result of suggestions made by the Child Soldiers and their families. In total 11 projects were formulated, which CCF submitted to various organizations to raise funds or finance.

Two major problems were thrown up at this phase of the process:

- first - the original concept and elaboration of the projects (design and writing up), should have been done by SECOR, but given the slowness and the lack of sufficient coordination, they were in fact drawn up by activists with the help of provincial CCF teams.
- Secondly: the problem of delay in approval and in financing of these initiatives and projects submitted to SECOR.

**Projects which were implemented:**

<i>Name of the project</i>	Support for the civil legalization of MD	Building of 3 Bakeries	Auto-construction of 65 houses
<i>Person responsible</i>	CCF	CCF	CCF
<i>Financial sponsor</i>	SECOR	SECOR	Norwegian Embassy
<i>Value in Usd</i>	5.400\$00	5.194\$50	89.964\$00
<i>Those who benefitted</i>	100 MD	12 MD	65 MD
<i>Starting date</i>	Nov.97	Nov.97	March.1997
<i>Finishing date</i>	30.Aug.98	30.10.98	30.12.98
<i>Province</i>	Malange	Malange	Malange

There was considerable success in the implementation of these projects. Within the Project of Civil legalization it was possible to register 166 Child soldiers, as they had acquired Forms to Register and Identity Cards. This project was very important because it meant that these minors now had citizen status, which helped a lot in their social integration.

The three bakeries were constructed and 12 demobilized youngsters started baking bread with the help of a master baker in October, 1998.

Due to the worsening of the political and military situation, it has not been possible to follow up closely the last actions planned within the project of auto-construction of houses.

**Projects, which were approved but which, were not implemented due to the worsening of the political and military situation**

<i>Province</i>	<i>Munici Pality</i>	<i>Name of the project</i>	<i>Person responsible</i>	<i>Financia l sponsor</i>	<i>Value in Usd</i>	<i>Those who benefitted</i>
Huambo	Longonjo	AGRO-Longonjo	CCF	SECOR	2.000\$00	10 families
	Ukuma	AGRO-Ukuma	CCF	SECOR	2.000\$00	10 families
	Ukuma	AGRO-Ukuma	CCF	SECOR	2.000\$00	10 families
	Caála	AGRO-Kalenga	CCF	SECOR	2.000\$00	10 families
	Bailundo	Training of demobilized soldiers	Evangelical Baptist Church	OIT	30.000\$00	120 soldiers demobilized

### Projects which were submitted to SECOR and are awaiting approval

<b>PROVINCE</b>	<b>MUNICIPALITY</b>	<b>NAME OF THE PROJECT</b>	<b>PERSON RESPONSIBLE</b>	<b>FINANCIAL SPONSOR</b>	<b>VALUE IN USD</b>	<b>THOSE WHO BENEFITED</b>
Huambo	Huambo	Professional Training for the demobilized minors	Missionary Nuns of Espirito Santo	SECOR	11.036\$00	250 families
Bié	Chitembo	Agricultural Development in Chitembo	Parish of Chitembo	SECOR	61.300\$00	20 MD 100 other youngsters
Bié	Katabola	Sports Expansion Project in Katabola	Parish of Katabola	SKN	4.600\$00	Almost 1,500 children and youngsters
Moxico	Luena	Auto-construction of 15 houses	CCF	SECOR	12.000\$00	
Benguela	Ganda	Construction of a Flour mill in the Church Training Centre in Ganda	Parish of Ganda	SECOR		
Uige		Repairs to Dunga School	CCF	SECOR	9.910\$00	900 children and youngsters

### V- SCHOOL AND WORK PLACEMENTS OF CHILD-SOLDIERS

According to the data sent from the provinces, 207 minors are studying, which represents only 12% of the general total of minors followed up by CCF. This is due to:

- ◆ lack of schools or because schools have been destroyed, difficulties in enrolment, due to lack of places, or lack of requisite documentation, or due to the relatively late arrival for the new school year
- ◆ shortage of teachers
- ◆ relative disinterest in studying on the part of the minors due to their age and their shame at having to study in classes with children of primary school age (lack of classes especially for the youngsters themselves)
- ◆ greater interest and ambitions related to business, employment and economic survival

### Percentage of Minors who study in the provinces

PROVINCE	Nº of minors followed up	Nº who study	%
BENGUELA	315	18	5.7
BIE	278	83	29.8
HUAMBO	309	10	3.2
HUILA	290	8	2.8
MALANGE	210	42	20
MOXICO	84	34	40.5
UIGE	135	12	8.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1621</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>12.8</b>

Almost at the end of the school year it was realized that nearly 20% of the young people and minors had abandoned school, amongst other reasons, due to the pressing need they felt to dedicate themselves to activities which would provide them with some money, as the majority already have family commitments.

Of the total of minors followed up only 4.5% were studying on vocational courses. This is due to various factors, such as:

- difficulties of access onto courses (few courses available)
- the paper qualifications necessary in order to follow a course are greater than the qualifications they actually possess
- the length of the courses, together with the lack of allowances which would mean that they could not support themselves and their dependents
- courses were held mainly in the provincial capitals, thus excluding those who live in the municipalities
- lack of correspondence between the courses organized and the minors' expectations

The provinces where there is the highest number of minors following vocational courses are Bié and Huíla.

### Minors who followed vocational courses

PROVINCE	Minors Followed-up	On Courses	
	Nº	Nº	%
BENGUELA	315	10	3.2
BIE	278	23	8.3
HUAMBO	309	5	1.6
HUILA	290	22	7.6
MALANGE	210	0	0
MOXICO	84	9	10.7
UIGE	135	4	2.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,621</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>4.5</b>

## **Employment**

Of the total number of minors followed up only 2.4% are working, mainly as hawkers, some in demining brigades, in the police and as cleaners.

In the appendix you can see data on the different occupations of the Child-Soldiers in their communities

## **VI- CASE STUDIES AND DATA ON THE DEGREE OF EXPOSURE AND IMPACT OF THE WAR**

### **Study of the cases and research into the Traditional Forms of Reintegration of Ex-Soldiers**

31 cases of Child Soldiers who had been reintegrated and followed up were studied. In a supplementary project of anthropological research, a survey was made of the mechanisms used by the communities in the reintegration of child-soldiers. To this end, Traditional chiefs, Traditional Healers, elders of the community and women were interviewed. \*.

The research showed different forms and strategies used by the communities in the reception of the ex-soldiers for the cleansing of their spirits. The reception ceremonies are carried out at the moment of arrival in the community and vary from region to region. In the case of a youngster manifesting reactions at a later date, suffering from some illness or disease or some sort of psychosocial disturbance, he is submitted to traditional treatment.

Throughout the Project, nine families asked for the support of CCF, as they had no money to carry out and pay for the services of traditional healers in the cure of their relatives who were ex-soldiers and minors. Before or after the treatments, the minors were contacted and interviewed.

### **Scale of exposure and impact applied**

One of the indicators foresees the application of the Scales of Exposure and Impact after the reunification of the families. 216 scales were applied. We wanted to find out the degree of exposure and impact of the war on the ex- child soldiers. The results of this study cover information relative to only 169 ex-child soldiers who were interviewed after being reintegrated into their families.

*Please see the Appendix of the results of this Study of Exposure and Impact of the war on the Ex-Soldiers..*

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\* Consultant's Report written by Alcinda Howana.

## VII- PROJECT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

### Recruitment and Training of the Activists

The activists involved in the Project of Reintegration of the Demobilized Minors were mainly religious leader who work within the communities, indicated by the Bishops or Priests, who worked for the Project.

In the zones of greater political sensitivity, we also opted to talk to local authorities to obtain their consent, relative to the activists to be recruited.

*Number of activists involved from the beginning until the end of the Project*

<b>PROVÍNCIA</b>	<b>Nº ACTIVISTS Oct.96-Dec.97</b>	<b>Nº ACTIVISTS Jan-Aug.98</b>
BENGUELA	34	30
BIÉ	31	21
HUAMBO	26	25
HUILA	36	31
MALANGE	54	17
MOXICO	9	9
UIGE-KAMABATELA	27	25
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>158</b>

As can be seen from the map, initially 217 activists were involved. In February, 1998 there were 172 activists involved, whereas at the end of the project, this number had gone down to 158. All through the Project various activists stopped working with CCF, which was due fundamentally to:

- Impediments in carrying out the follow-up with the minors due to security problems
- Health problems or death

The majority of activists involved in the Project belong to the Catholic Church (89.4%). Another 10.69% belong to other Churches (Adventist, Evangelical, Apostolic, Baptist and the United Methodist Church). Only in the provinces of Moxico and Uige do the activists belong to the Catholic Church.

### Training of the Activists

The preparation of the activists was carried out during the seminars. The seminars were conducted on the basis of the training syllabus prepared by CCF, having been adapted to fit in with the nature of the work relating to the reintegration of child soldiers. Please see the appendix and the contents of the Training Courses.

The contents were taught by members of the national and provincial teams. 10 seminars took place, 2 in Huila, 2 in Uige, 1 in Bié, 2 in Benguela, 1 in Huambo and 1 in Malange. In these seminars, apart from the 135 CCF activists 39 other bodies or entities belonging to MINARS, SECOR, UNITA, IOM and IRSEM. Not all the activists attended the seminars, mainly because they had difficulty in getting to the towns. For these activists, small-group training sessions were planned, conducted by the coordinators in the localities where they live. Another form used for training, were the monthly meetings which the provincial coordinators held with the activists.

### **The Specifics of the work carried out by the Activists**

The activists had a very important role. They acted as a 'bridge' between the Child Soldiers, the communities and the organizations. They facilitated the process of building confidence, developing feelings of acceptance and the valorization of the minors and their return to the communities and their families.

Their work was decisive in the completion of the project, as in the first phase, the minors were aggressive, rebellious, and distrustful. The families, also distrusted the nature of the activity of the activists. The activists were thought of by the families, by the Traditional Chiefs and by the authorities within the community as figures who had a political role and job or who were connected to the new process of enlisting for their inclusion in the army. Through their dedicated work, a climate of confidence was established and attitudes and behaviour changed, leading to a greater acceptance of the follow-up work they did.

Their work was based on giving advice and counselling the minors and help in the overcoming the difficulties which they faced in the process of reintegration into their communities. Once a month the activists held meetings, where they talked about subjects linked to moral and civic education, reconciliation and friendship.

The capacity of intervention of the activists was greater in the localities under the control of the Government.. In the areas under the control of UNITA, the process did not make great progress. The activists were limited, as there was a permanent climate of suspicion in relation to their role in relation to the ex-soldiers. The visits to the minors were restricted, the process of registration was interpreted as an intrusion (being done not with individuals who had become civilians but with troops or soldiers). In some places the writing of reports was forbidden, as they judged that the collected information was being handed over to the "other side".

### **Supervision Visits of the National Team to the Provinces**

Altogether the national team made a total of 91 supervision visits to all the provinces. The national supervisors, coordinators and assistants working for the project, went to the provinces to analyze, on the ground, aspects connected to the technical and administrative implementation of the project.

### **Quarterly Meetings of Project Coordination**

Six quarterly Project coordination meetings were held in which the Representatives and the provincial Coordinators participated. These were held in Luanda.

In these meetings details were given regarding the implementation and the real situation in each province, and strategies were forged for the future functioning of the project. On a quarterly basis evaluation was carried out regarding the zones of access and the security zones in the provinces where CCF-Unicef worked. Alternatives were put forward which would allow the implementation of the project taking into account the political and military situation on the ground.

### **Workshop on the psychosocial status of the demobilized minors followed-up by members of the Project**

The Workshop was held in Luanda on 27<sup>th</sup> February 1998, representatives of the following organizations were represented, UCAH, MINARS, Ministry of Education, UNICEF, IRSEM-SECOR, SCF(UK) and Médico Internacional and including the presence of the Director of USAID in Angola. During the Workshop, CCF presented data relative to the educational, psychosocial and occupational profile of 1,033 Child-Soldiers reintegrated into their families.

### **Treatment and systematization of data - Data-Base**

A database was set up and the data was compiled in the computer and sent to the activists regarding the process of follow-up. A synthesis of this data referring to 1,033 minors has already been published.

A serious problem with the database at CCF meant that part of the information already compiled was lost. CCF worked in conjunction with INE- the National Institute of Statistics so that the data still available relating to the follow-up of Child Soldiers by the activists could be re-compiled.

### **Participation in the meetings of the (Ad Hoc) technical group for demobilization.**

In all the provinces CCF participated in meetings and activities of the Ad Hoc Group for demobilization. These groups met on a fortnightly basis. This allowed for joint planning amongst the partners, and decisions were taken regarding the activities to take place in the province in the ambit of demobilization.

### **Training and Up-grading of National Team of CCF**

Throughout the project, four training sessions were held for the CCF team. These seminars were orientated by ILAS- The Latin-American Institute for Mental Health and Human Rights. They were a forum for raising questions related to psychosocial intervention in post-war contexts and on the reintegration of the Child Soldier.

## VIII- RESUME OF THE MAIN RESULTS OBTAINED IN THE PROJECT

### INDICATORS ESTABLISHED AND RESULTS OBTAINED

<b>INTERVEN- TION PHASE</b>	<b>ESTABLISHED INDICATORS</b>	<b>RESULTS OBTAINED</b>	<b>% ATTAINED</b>
1 <sup>ST</sup> Phase: Preparation, Family Tracing, and sensitization of the communities for the reception of the demobilized Child Soldiers.	Three hundred (300) activists	<i>217 activists were recruited</i>	72,3%
	Ten (10) Meetings with Bishops and Religious Bodies	<i>111 meetings were held with Bishops and Religious bodies</i>	1110%
	One thousand five hundred (1,500) families were contacted	<i>1,500 families were localized and contacted</i>	100%
	50 Meeting Points were established	<i>102 Meeting Points were established</i>	204%
2 <sup>nd</sup> Phase: Demobilization and Family Reunions	3,000 Child Soldiers were reunited with their families with the help of the activists	<i>2,153 Child Soldiers were reunited with their families in the presence of CCF activists</i>	71.8%
	Alternative solutions were found to reunite Child Soldiers who had not met up with their families at the Meeting Points on the day of demobilization	<i>1,593 Child Soldiers became the responsibility of religious activists, traditional chiefs or authorities on the day of their return to the community, until they were reunited.</i>	
	200 Child Soldiers who lost contact with their families were placed in substitute families	<i>53 Child Soldiers live with substitute families</i>	26.5%
<b>INTERVEN- TION PHASE</b>	<b>ESTABLISHED INDICATORS</b>	<b>RESULTS OBTAINED</b>	<b>% ATTAINED</b>

<p>3<sup>rd</sup> Phase: Social Reintegration of the Child Soldiers in the Community</p>	<p>10 Case studies of minors who have undergone traditional healing</p> <p>300 Scales to test impact of war on minors to be applied within one month of demobilization and after 6 months</p> <p>Activists will be visited by the coordinators</p> <p>Activists will hold meetings with child soldiers in the communities for counseling, peace education and information on minors' rights</p> <p>A Data Base will be set up and the information will be disclosed to the partners</p> <p>Projects of economic and social integration will be identified and referred to SECOR</p>	<p><i>31 case studies were carried out</i></p> <p><i>216 scales were applied</i></p> <p><i>354 visits were made</i></p> <p><i>248 meetings were held</i></p> <p><i>The Data Base was set up and the partners were informed of the results of the work</i></p> <p><i>11 projects were identified. Of these 3 were implemented in Malange province</i></p>	<p>310%</p> <p>72%</p>
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## **THIRD PART: PROBLEMS, POSITIVE FACTORS PROBLEMAS, FACTORES POSITIVOS AND LESSONS LEARNTE LI ES APRENDIDAS**

### **I- MAIN PROBLEMS**

In general the process encountered many problems. Amongst the main ones the following should be noted:

#### **General Problems**

- ◆ In the global context of insecurity and political and military instability in the country (distrust, fear, lack of free circulation of people and goods, lack of political goodwill or opening, division of territory in the provinces into "two sides", local authorities from two governments existed.
- ◆ Constant intimidations, persecutions, accusations and distrust of the work being done by the catechists, on the part of the local authorities.
- ◆ Incomprehension and distrust on the part of the family and the community in relation to the type of work carried out by the activists.
- ◆ Difficulties of Access to localities due to blocked roads, destroyed bridges, mined zones, etc.
- ◆ Problems of logistic-material nature: Lack of transport and interprovincial radio communication.
- ◆ UNITA authorities disrespected the policies and principles established in relation to reunion and follow-up and the role of the activists.

#### **Specific Problems**

Preparation phase and sensibilization of the families and communities:

- ◆ Problems in the tracing of the families due to the following : UCAH lists came with changed names, they did not specify the most essential data and more detailed data, for example the name of the village and name of the traditional chief was omitted. Various Child Soldiers did not give their names correctly, or changed their names, others did not declare their relatives' names correctly, or the latter had moved residence.
- ◆ Fear, on the part of some families, during the tracer phase of recognizing their children, fear of suffering reprisals later, and of being associated with the other side.
- ◆ Interference on the part of UNITA authorities in the selection of the religious activists (they indicated only those who were on their side).
- ◆ Lack of confidentiality, respect and privacy in the registering of the Child Soldiers data in the Quartering areas. This was not done in a climate of confidentiality and with enough freedom. The Child Soldiers gave details in front of other people and UNITA Officials were present at the process of registration, imposing or filtering information given by the Child Soldiers.
- ◆ At the time of registration in the quartering areas, there was interference or influence of various languages, and the need for simultaneous translation (from Portuguese into the national language or vice-versa, from Portuguese into the foreign interviewer's language and vice-versa)

## **Phase of Family Reunification Fase de Reunificaci3n Familiar**

- ◆ There was manipulation of the minors' destinations in the Quartering areas on the part of UNITA.
- ◆ Changes in destinations at the time of transportation or just before.
- ◆ Despair and lack of faith on the part of the families in relation to the demobilized minors' destinations, i.e. where they were not reunited in their place of origin, (after being informed of the desmobilization, the relatives waited weeks and sometimes months without the minors returning to their communities).
- ◆ Fear instilled in the minors. On leaving the quartering areas they were afraid, frightened of being harassed and mistreated by Government authorities and by the people.
- ◆ Simulated Reception of the Minors in some places by so-called uncles, who at one and the same time received 15 to 20 demobilized minors.
- ◆ Substantial delays, the dates agreed for transportation were not adhered to.
- ◆ Lack of coordination and no respect for the established Meeting Points. The minors were left in the communities without the presence of the religious activists, it was then difficult or impossible to return and contact was lost, follow-up proved impossible.
- ◆ Transportation was arranged in the rainy season and the roads were in a terrible state.
- ◆ Restrictions imposed on the transportation routes.
- ◆ Insufficient coordination between IOM and CCF when the Child Soldiers were transported to their zones of origin (Did not keep to the Meeting Points fixed by CCF, delays in communication with CCF regarding the departure and arrival dates of the minors on the part of IOM).

## **Problems during the Phase of Reintegration Problemas durante a Fase de Reintegra3n**

- ◆ Difficulties of Access for the minors transported to their communities
- ◆ Minors tried to escape and there were constant movements of minors from the areas where they had stayed to other areas, hindering the follow-up process and reintegration
- ◆ Delays and failure to distribute goods and allowances promised to the Child Soldiers on the part of the partners. Delays in the payment of SEAR and in the delivery of the food rations, in some cases, of more than 4 months.
- ◆ Promises were not kept in relation to vocational training, school and work placements, and assistance in finding accommodation.
- ◆ Delays in the implementation of RIPs – Rapid Impact Projects
- ◆ Despair and sometimes frustration on the part of the minors on arriving in their communities, and on being confronted with abject poverty, and lack of opportunities to fulfil their ambitions
- ◆ Problems of articulation between the partners in the distribution of goods and allowances (SEAR and food rations). For example, when the minors went to the cities to receive SEAR, they stayed there more than 1 month, with no support from the authorities.
- ◆ Minors felt dejected and dropped-out of vocational courses (they did not receive their allowances, the courses were too long and they needed to start earning money as quickly as possible).
- ◆ Lack of training support materials and school material for the minors who were integrated into schools.

- ◆ Badly-prepared Activists unable to accomplish the in-depth work of psychosocial recovery.
- ◆ High level of poverty in the families, which meant they had unrealistic expectations and made unrealistic demands on the minors regarding reintegration.
- ◆ Changes in authority and status in the communities, due to arrival of the minors who had power and means to support their families.
- ◆ Lack of opportunities in the communities (schools, employment, housing.)
- ◆ Re-recruitment of the Child Soldiers into the army.
- ◆ Problems with the police relating to identification papers, above all in the cities;
- ◆ The absence (almost total) of a coordinated and consolidated policy for reintegration. The efforts and action undertaken to facilitate reintegration required efficient coordination which would make it well-structured, articulated, broad and sustainable.

In summary we can classify the problems in this way:

- ◆ Those related to insecurity and political-military instability in the country
- ◆ Those related to the socio-economic situation of the families and the communities
- ◆ Those linked to the design and the structure of the Project, its internal organization and its management
- ◆ Problems of a logistical and material nature.
- ◆ Problems related to the partners

## **II- POSITIVE FACTORES THAT FACILITATED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT - STRONG POINTS**

### *The antecedents and the experience of CCF*

The experience CCF acquired in the rehabilitation of children affected by the war, a work-model based on respect for traditional beliefs and values, gave the project for the reintegration of Child Soldiers, the possibility of development adapted to the Angolan context. CCF's experience in Angola allowed the project to develop, and reconcile modern forms of treatment and psychosocial recovery with traditional forms of healing and reintegration.

### *The alliance that was established with the Church*

The Churches in Angola, mainly the Catholic Church, are institutions that in spite of the war, have maintained their structures throughout the country. This guaranteed a broad penetration within the communities. The alliance with the Church allowed more in-depth work on aspects of reconciliation and pacification of the spirits of the Child Soldiers demobilized from the army.

### *Alliance with the traditional leaders, the elders and traditional healers:*

On the basis of experience of the implementation of PBWTT - Project of Reintegration of Children Affected by the War, and on the type of approach that reconciles modern forms of psychosocial reintegration with traditional forms used throughout the Project, a strong partnership was formed with the Sobas (traditional chiefs), with the Elders and with the traditional healers. All the activities developed in the communities, were agreed to by them and they took an active part in such

activities. The traditional healers helped at ceremonies of traditional rites, the receiving of purification and the expulsion of evil spirits. In this way, the resources, the structures and the communities' wisdom were valued.

*Involvement in the work of national and locally- recruited personnel.*

The fact that the whole team that developed the Project were Angolan, meant the experience acquired can be reused and sustained. It also meant that all contacts, and the whole process of psycho-social recovery and family and social reintegration were carried out using national languages and the local culture. The involvement of Angolans also helped in the process of reunion and stimulated dialogue amongst Angolans.

*Acceptance and prestige of the activists in the communities, their role as pacifiers.*

The catechists (religious activists) in the communities are very respected figures. They intervened, not only in the resolution of conflicts, but also helped in the education and training of the youngsters. They are excellent educators. The alliance with the catechists, who became activists of the project, was one of the most positive aspects of the work.

*Zeal of CCF in the identification and implementation of Projects of Rapid Impact*

Although it was not initially foreseen, the CCF provincial teams and the activists played a key role in the preparation of projects, and acted as intermediaries with the minors, the communities and the donor organizations, such as SeCor.

CCF's role was to identify needs and to refer the Child Soldiers to SeCor, but as a consequence of the follow-up process the activists ended up becoming development agents and managers of the same projects.

### **III- LESSONS LEARNED IN THE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA**

- Ø Need for projects of this nature to be fully implemented in contexts of peace and national reconciliation, because in the case of Angola, the project was much more dependent on political will, than on technical capacity in its implementation.
- Ø Need to have group work and greater interlinking and cooperation among the different agencies and organizations.
- Ø Greater need to establish alliances in replacing the structures and key players in the community. Strengthening of the role of the authorities and of the local leaders (sobas, catechists, etc).
- Ø Need to carry out an in-depth study of the mechanisms used by the communities which facilitated the social reintegration of ex-soldiers, and to involve the traditional healers in the process of psycho-social recovery.

- Ø The work of reintegration of Child Soldiers in a context of abject poverty and large-scale destruction demands the preparation of a strong system of follow-up and prioritization of projects which generate income.
- Ø A good system of follow-up of the demobilized minors means the setting up of projects which, not only benefit the Child soldier, but also the whole community (deeply affected by the war – to avoid discrimination which can impede real community reintegration.)
  - The excess of material support, without orientation can cause
    - logistic difficulties
    - can be understood as a 'prize or bonus'
    - can create dependence and lack of creativity
    - can cause alterations of a social nature, especially in small communities.
- Ø The system of apprenticeship, using teachers from their own communities is more efficient, because it allows for training in the locality, reduces transport and accommodation costs in large centres, and does not up-root the youngster from their home-town. It also has a better chance of being suited to the economic context and the needs of the local community.
- Ø Probably, if the quartering of the Child Soldiers had been separate from that of adult soldiers, then the climate of manipulation and terror, which reigned, would not have existed.

## APPENDIX I

### **ROLE OF EACH OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE PROGRAMME OF DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS IN ANGOLA**

*UNICEF- Technical support, in collaboration with CCF, in the training of trainers and material support ie educational kits to develop play activities.*

*Christian Children's Fund (CCF.)- training of the different parties involved in the process, concentrating on community leaders and social structures existent in the resettlement zones; tracing of families and monitoring of the reintegration process.*

*Save the Children's Fund (SCF-UK) and MINARS (Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration - assisted in the tracing and reunification of the child soldiers with their families.*

*Médico Internacional (MI)- Consultants who provided training for Angolan participants in the project, focusing especially on psycho social techniques used in the recuperation of the war-damaged child soldiers.*

*IOM - International Organization of Migration- Support in the transportation of Child Soldiers and the supply of demobilization kits ie support material for resettlement;*

*Other NGOs: German Agriculture Action (AAA), AFRICARE, IMA (International Medical Assistance), International Centre for Cooperation Allo Sviluppo (CICS), Catholic Relief Services, Centre of Education on Sanitation and Appropriate Sanitation Technology (CESTAS), Portuguese Institute of Preventive Medicine (IPMP), Movimento Liberazione e Sviluppo (MOLISV), Save the Children-USA and World Vision International- as implementing agencies, they managed the general programmes of humanitarian aid in the Quartering Areas.*

## APPENDIX II

### **GOODS AND ALLOWANCES THAT THE CHILD SOLDIERS WERE ENTITLED TO DURING THE PROCESS OF DEMOBILIZATION IN ANGOLA.**


- Ø Money (Special resettlement allowance - SEAR), donated by the Government of Angola, paid in three instalments, the first instalment to be received on the day of demobilisation, the second four months later and the third eight months later.
- Ø Kit donated by IOM (a pack of civilian clothing, a pack of agricultural implements, a pack of cutlery and kitchen utensils, a kit of basic construction tools), received on the day of demobilization.
- Ø Kit donated by the Portuguese Government (radio, batteries, T shirt, hat or beret and a cartoon book), received on the day of demobilization.
- Ø Food for resettlement and for reintegration, handed over on the day of demobilization and over a period of nine months, to be distributed on a quarterly basis following the date of demobilization by the WFP- World Food Program.
- Ø Transport in order to return to the community of their choice, provided by IOM.

## APPENDIX III

### **PROFILE OF EX-CHILD SOLDIERS**

#### *1- Their age now and their age on becoming soldiers*

At the moment the majority of demobilized (62.8%) ex-child soldiers are, on average, between 17 and 18 years old, only 1.8% are under 14. Almost 52% were between 13 and 14 when they became soldiers.




### Age Group

Table showing the relation between their real age and the age at which they became soldiers.

Real age	10-12	13-14	15-16	17-18	Total
10-12	100.0	-----	----	---	100
13-14	50.0	50.0	----	---	100
15-16	90.0	10.0	----	---	100
17-18	5.0	68.8	25.0	1.3	100
19-21	8.1	27.0	51.4	13.5	100
Total	<b>13.8</b>	<b>51.5</b>	<b>30.0</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>100</b>

On average they spent 3.8 years as soldiers. Most were soldiers for about four years, which means that the majority of them were mobilized after 1992 as is shown below.



## **2- When they became soldiers**

The majority of children became soldiers after war broke out again in 1992, only 21% became soldiers before this date. Around 90.5% were forced to become soldiers i.e. they were rounded up or kidnapped.

### **Period when they became soldiers**

<b>Period</b>	<b>%</b>
Before 1992	21.0
Between 1992-96	79.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

### **The way they were enlisted**

<b>Form of enlisting</b>	<b>%</b>
Forced	90.5
Voluntary	9.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

### 3- Activity engaged in while they were soldiers

Their main activities were related to the practice of war, namely: patrol duty and active combat. These activities represent 32.5% of the total. Other activities most often quoted are those related to logistics, which represent 22.5% of the total. These required that food and arms be transported.

<b>Activities while they were soldiers</b>	
<b>What they did as soldiers</b>	<b>%</b>
Combat	15.1
Transporting food	13.9
Artillery/Infantry	11.4
Transport of Arms	9.9
Guards	7.9
Body Guards	3.9
Go looking for food across enemy lines	0.7
Drivers	0.7
Administrative duties	3.9
Other	9.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

### 4- Participation in active combat

Nearly 71.9% of ex-soldiers participated in active combat. This situation reflects the high level of exposure to combat of ex-soldiers.

<b>Participation in combat</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Yes</b>	<b>71.9</b>
<b>No</b>	<b>28.1</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Although the above data indicates that approximately 71.9% of ex-soldiers had participated in active combat, this situation is worse than it appears as 95.8% of ex-soldiers had already accompanied or had had contact with soldiers.

### Have you at anytime accompanied or had contact with military personnel

Accompanied or had contact with military forces	%
Yes	95.8
No	4.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>


If we analyze this participation and take into account the age of the ex-soldiers, we find that in all age groups more than half had taken part in active combat. This situation is even more dramatic if we take into account that the youngest age groups i.e. the total of ex-soldiers who are under 15 had already taken part in active combat.

### Participation in active combat by age-group Have you ever taken part in active combat?

	Yes	No	Total
10-14	100	-	100
15-16	58.8	41.2	100
17-18	73.1	26.9	100
19-21	75.0	25	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>72.6</b>	<b>27.4</b>	<b>100</b>

The length of time that ex-soldiers spent in combat is notorious, about 25% spent 2 years, 21.3% spent days and 9.3% only hours.

### Time Spent in Combat



On asking the ex-soldiers if they had ever shot anyone 77.5% said they had. Such a high percentage will have repercussions later in terms of the psychosomatic behavior of these children.

### Have you ever shot anyone?

Have you ever shot anyone?	%
Yes	77.5
No	22.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

### 5- Reintegration of ex-soldiers

#### Who they lived with before becoming soldiers

Before becoming soldiers the majority of child-soldiers lived with their parents (79%) and only 10.2% lived with their brothers or sisters. The role of other relatives, in this case, is not relevant.

#### Person you lived with before being a soldier

Who did you live with before being a soldier	%
Parents	79.0
Uncles and Aunts	4.0
Brothers or sisters	10.2
Grandparents	2.3
Other relatives	1.1
Non-relatives/Guardians	1.7
Not revealed	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

#### Who they lived with after demobilization

After being demobilized the majority of ex-soldiers went to live with other people which would lead us to believe that they changed residence. Only approximately half of the ex-soldiers continue to live with their parents, and the others were taken in by or live with other relatives, either with aunts and uncles or brothers and sisters.

### Person you lived with after being a soldier

Who did you live with after leaving the army?	%
Parents	47.0
Uncles and Aunts	17.5
Brothers or sisters	22.9
Grandparents	2.4
Other relatives	4.2
Non-relatives/Guardians	3.0
Alone	0.6
Not revealed	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

### Who do you live with now?

When interviewed, about 16% of ex-soldiers were no longer living with the same people they had initially lived with when demobilized. The main reasons for having changed residence were the need to study and problems in family relationships.


### Main reasons given for not now living with the same people



## 6- Social and Economic Characteristics.

### Level of Education

Before becoming soldiers 91% of those interviewed went to school. Of these about 50% were in the 3rd. and 4th grades of primary school and 5.5% had completed their primary schooling.



Presently, only 21.8% of the ex-soldiers are studying. If we analyze the data by age we see that the youngest ex-soldiers are those who are not within the educational system, however, they represent only 7% of the total number.

### Relationship between age and what they are studying now Are you studying now?

Age	Yes	No	Total
10-12		100	100
13-14		100	100
15-16	11.8	88.2	100
17-18	24.1	75.9	100
19-21	16.3	83.7	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>79.5</b>	<b>100</b>

The main reasons given for not going to school are, in the majority of cases, to do with the fact that there are no teachers available, or having arrived too late i.e. after the start of the school year and not having the right documentation to register in school.\*

\*There are other reasons which ex soldiers do not want to divulge but which the inquirers understood, they are: 1) Lack of interest in school ( people are more interested in small business activities) 2) shame at having to be in the same class as children of primary school age.

### Main reasons why they are not studying now

<b>Main Reasons</b>	<b>%</b>
Did not manage to enroll	13.4
Lack of documentation	17.3
School has been destroyed	7.9
No teacher available	31.5
Arrived after the start of the school year	22.8
Other reasons	7.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

### Economic Activity in which they are involved

Almost 51.4% of ex-soldiers were not involved in any form of gainful employment when interviewed.

#### Were they involved in any gainful employment when interviewed?

	<b>%</b>
Yes	47.5
No	51.4
No reply	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

The main reason quoted for not having any gainful employment was the lack of jobs. This situation affects around 67%, which means that 2 out of 3 ex-soldiers say that the dearth of jobs is the main reason for not being in employment.

### Main reasons for not being in employment

<b>Main Reasons</b>	<b>%</b>
No jobs available	70.0
Because they are students	13.8
Physical disability	10.8
Other	5.0
No reply	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>


For those ex-soldiers who had some form of occupation, the majority (42.3%) were helping on family plots of land and 26.4% were self-employed. This means that the majority are engaged in agricultural work. Only 11% were involved in small business activities.

### Main Occupation

What they do now	%
In training	3.9
Helping on family small-holdings	36.1
Own plot of land	29.7
Involved in small business activities	22.6
Other occupations	5.8
No reply	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

### Jobs they would like to have in the future

Of those ex-child soldiers interviewed the majority (58%) want to be mechanics. We infer from this that through their constant contact with war materials, and military vehicles they gained some experience of these, and as a result feel more attracted to this job. The next most popular choice of employment is carpenter which, however, does not reach 14% on their scale of preference.




## TYPES OF SITUATIONS WHICH THEY WERE EXPOSED TO DURING THE WAR.

### Situations

In general they were exposed to a number of dangerous situations.

Long marches, exchanges of gunfire, artillery fire were quoted by half of the ex-soldiers as the situations in which they most frequently found themselves.



### Death of Relations


Approximately 67% of the ex-soldiers said that they had lost members of their family or close friends during the war. Most of them were aunts/uncles or brothers and sisters.

**Table: Relatives or friends killed during the war.**

<b>Relatives or close friends who died</b>	<b>%</b>
Grandparents	4.4
Brothers and sisters	20.4
Aunts and uncles	28.3
Father	4.4
Mother	1.8
Friends and fellow soldiers	12.4
Other relatives	15.9
Someone close	8.8
Almost all the family	3.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

- 36% of deaths were as a result of shootings
- 28% of deaths occurred during an attack or ambush
- 13% happened during an exchange of gunfire
- 6% through mine accidents.

**Main Reasons for Death**



### ***Situations which were lived through during the war***

During the war the majority of ex-soldiers were exposed to the following situations (among others):

#### **They witnessed**

- 42% saw people wounded, severely beaten or killed
- 18% saw people being mistreated, tortured
- 7.7% saw women being raped

## Direct Victims

- 14% lived through terrifying experiences such as, being kidnapped or being severely beaten
- 7.3% were held in prison
- 1.1% stepped on land mines

## Consequences of War


During the war the ex-soldiers were exposed to various situations. Those that shocked them most were seeing people being killed, 2 out of 3 ex-soldiers (65.9%) declared having seen this happen more than 3 times. Another important event was that they themselves were placed in life and death situations. 51% declared having been in this type of situation.

Table Events to which they were exposed during the war


During the war	Yes	No. of times	%
Were wounded	29%	1	89.9
		2	6.1
		>3	4.1
Escaped death	51.4	1	60.5
		2	19.7
		>3	18.8
Witnessed people being killed	76.0	1	17.8
		2	16.3
		>3	65.9

The circumstances in which the 29% and 51% of ex-soldiers were wounded are almost the same. Most quote attacks, combat operations and exchange of gunfire. Wounding as a result of the explosion of a mine is an important factor, almost 20% of ex-soldiers were victims of such situations.


### Circumstances in which they were wounded



### Way they escaped death




Of the 76% who saw people being killed, the incident in which they died was a direct result of the nature of war itself, the majority of people having been killed in attacks and during active combat.





### Other consequences

The following diagram shows other consequences of the war on the lives of ex-soldiers, such as, and in order of significance, 19% had to stop studying, 18% were separated from their families and 17% abandoned the region where they lived (17%).



Around 20.1% of ex-soldiers live with the consequences of the war. Scars, hearing difficulties and shrapnel are the main difficulties/handicaps quoted. The main causes of these handicaps or disabilities are mines, explosions and attacks. About 12% of the ex-child soldiers complained of constant pain in the chest and in the back, being consequences of having had to carry very heavy loads.



***The worst thing they lived through during the war***

On being asked what was the worst thing that happened to them during the war the majority said the following, in order of importance:

- 28.7% war itself
- 13% seeing people being killed
- 7.2% suffering hardship, such as hunger, thirst, eating food without salt, loss of sleep

- 6% long marches
- 3.6% being forced to take part in combat

## IMPACT OF THE EVENTS LIVED THROUGH DURING THE WAR


Generally war had a strong impact on the ex-soldiers. For example,

### 4.1 The most "ever present" frequent reactions

**50.4%** When thinking of the past, try to forget and block out what happened.

**20.3%** Always afraid of something terrible happening

**16.7%** Thinking that what happened could happen again.



### Reactions they "sometimes" have

37.6% They frequently remember things that happened during the war


35.6% When doing things their concentration span is short

31.6% They have palpitations

30.8% When doing things it is difficult to concentrate. They feel bad, and nervous when they see or hear things similar to what happened to them

Another aspect of their behavior is manifested through the psychosomatic effects, which the ex-soldiers feel when they think of past events, and when they hear gunfire. Their heartbeat quickens, this is one of the effects most often spoken of.

**Main reactions which are "sometimes" present**



29.3% - Constantly relive past events.  
 30.8% - Feel bad and become nervous when they hear certain sounds.  
 31.6% - Find it difficult to concentrate when doing things.  
 35.6% - Have palpitations.  
 37.6% - Often remember things that happened during the war.

**Impact of events experienced during the war**

	No	Sometime	Always	Totals
<b>"Ever-present reactions"</b>				
1. When they think of things which happened in the past, they try to get them out of their heads, try to block things out	30.1	19.5	50.4	100
2. They are always frightened that something terrible will happen	58.6	21.1	20.3	100
3. They feel that what happened previously could happen again.	66.7	16.7	16.7	100

**"Sometimes" present reactions**

1. Tend to remember things that happened during the war	50.4	37.6	12.0	100
2. When they think of the past or hear gunshots their heart starts to beat fast.	33.9	35.6	30.5	100
3. When doing something it is	60.2	31.6	8.3	100

difficult to concentrate				
4. They feel bad, are nervous when they see or hear things similar to those that they themselves experienced.	54.9	30.8	14.3	100
5. They dream about what happened to them, (day-dream, they have nightmares)	64.4	28.0	7.6	100
6. They relive what happened to them (hear sounds, see images)	61.7	29.3	9.0	100

### Other reactions

Have difficulty in sleeping, suffer from insomnia	59.1	25.0	15.9	100
They think that now they are more nervous than before and get easily frightened	60.9	23.3	15.8	100
When they think about what happened or when they hear gun-shots				
they have headaches	72.2	17.4	10.4	100
they have stomach-ache	75.2	17.8	6.9	100
they feel dizzy	81.0	11.4	7.6	100

### *Talking about past events with other people*

Talking about past events is common amongst ex-soldiers, 44% of those interviewed do so. Generally, relatives, friends and fellow soldiers are the people with whom their past experiences are shared.

Table People with whom they discuss past events

<b>People with whom they discuss past events</b>	<b>%</b>
Relatives	36.7
Fellow soldiers	24.1
With their father	3.8
With friends	29.1
Others	6.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

## ***Ever-present reactions and how they relate to the type of events experienced***

1. When they think of the things that happened, they try to get them out of their minds, try to block out memories, this reaction is more pronounced in those who say that the following events were the worst thing that had ever happened to them:

- war itself
- seeing people being killed
- being forced to fight


Whenever they think of things that happened, they try to get them out of their mind, and try to block them out



2. They are constantly afraid that something terrible will happen to them, is the most pronounced reaction of those ex-soldiers who say that the following events were the worst thing that have ever happened to them

- **the war itself**
- **having killed someone**
- **witnessing people being killed**


They are always afraid that something terrible will happen to them



3. They feel that what happened to them can happen again ( that war can break out again) is the most pronounced reaction of those ex-soldiers who say that the following events were the worst thing that could have happened to them;

- the war itself
- having killed someone
- being forced to fight

They feel that what happened could happen again, "war could break out again"



The most frequent reactions experienced by the ex-soldiers are mainly related to war itself.

## Conclusions

This study was undertaken in 6 provinces and allows us to conclude the following:

### Profile of ex-child soldiers

- Now the majority of them (63%) are between 17-18 years old and around half was 13-14 when they started their military careers.
- On average they were soldiers for 3.8 years, which means that the majority became soldiers after 1992.
- The main activities they were involved in as soldiers had more to do with the practice of war, such as: patrol duty, active combat, representing 32.5% of the total.
- Approximately 91% of the ex soldiers had already had some schooling before becoming soldiers. Half of them were either in 3rd or 4th grade and 5.5% had already completed primary school.
- In terms of what they would like to do in the future, 58% would like to be mechanics. This ambition has been influenced by the contact they had with war materials;

Situations they were exposed to during the war

- In general ex-soldiers were exposed to a number of dangerous situations. In particular long marches, exchanges of gun-fire and bombings were the most striking;
- During the war the ex-soldiers experienced many situations, 67% of the ex-soldiers personally witnessed such events, nearly 42% saw people being wounded, severely beaten or tortured.

### **Impact of these situations experienced during the war**

- The most frequent reactions are mainly those of trying to block out memories of what happened in the past, always afraid that something terrible could happen to them, or that past events can repeat themselves.
- Apart from the above reactions, others are also frequent, although they only happen sometimes, such as remembering what happened during the war, psychosomatic reactions, and difficulties in concentrating.